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SURVIVAL

A realistic description of the federal trial judge’s role might be
“Dealing with the Real World.” We are concerned with real people and
the impacts of law on those people. We observe real lives through our
window to the world. Where the law is inadequate or perverse, we report
our observations to those with power to lead: the public, the legislature,
and the appellate courts. And, from time to time, we bend the procedural
and substantive law to do justice in individual cases.
The perpetually troubled underclasses, the cheated consumers,
those injured by pharmaceuticals, and those deprived of constitutional
and other rights are grist for our mill. Too often we are reminded of
Job’s wail: “Behold, I cry out wrong, but I am not heard: I cry aloud, but
* United States District Judge for the Eastern District of New York. Judge Weinstein
delivered the keynote address at the University of Miami Law Review’s 2014 Symposium, Leading
from Below. See 2014 Symposium, U. MIAMI L. REV., http://lawreview.law.miami.edu/2014symposium/ (last visited Nov. 15, 2014).
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there is no judgment.”1
Amid massive abuse by the government of prisoners, the mentally
disabled, and those otherwise deprived, a class action with decrees and
long-term supervision is needed. Providing justice for those who need
help on a massive scale requires tough, controlling trial judges.
Allow me to illustrate my views on mass litigation by briefly touching on my own odyssey as a trial judge. Along the way, I have developed some personal “Rules for Survival.”
The first ten of these “Rules for Survival” address class actions,
quasi-class actions, multi-district litigations, and the like. In the real
world, such mass actions are the only practicable way to impose liability
on those causing major harm and to provide adequate remedies to the
many injured.2 In these remarks, I do not address the critical issue facing
our profession: the representational problems faced by the vast number
of individuals—immigrants, the poor, and the middle class—without
adequate counsel and without adequate civil legal protections.3 A discussion of the work being done to respond to these profound legal
problems must be left for another day.
Later, I will also state three of my personal “Rules for Survival” in
the criminal law context and then conclude with one “General Rule for
Survival.”
II.

MASS ACTIONS, TEN RULES

My first cases in the post-Brown4 1960’s involved African-Americans and the continued segregation of New York City’s public schools.5
1. Job 19:7 (King James 2000). Cf. Timothy Williams, Study Puts Exonerations at Record
Levels in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2014, at A12 (“The number of exonerations in the United
States of those wrongly convicted of a crime increased to a record 87 during 2013, and of that
number, nearly one in five had initially pleaded guilty to charges filed against them . . . .”).
2. See JACK B. WEINSTEIN, INDIVIDUAL JUSTICE IN MASS TORT LITIGATION: THE EFFECT OF
CLASS ACTIONS, CONSOLIDATIONS, AND OTHER MULTIPARTY DEVICES 1–2 (1995).
3. See, e.g., JUDITH S. KAYE & JONATHAN LIPPMAN, N.Y. STATE UNIFIED COURT SYS., THE
FUTURE OF PRO BONO IN NEW YORK: REPORT ON THE 2002 PRO BONO ACTIVITIES OF THE NEW
YORK STATE BAR iii (2004); Robert A. Katzmann, Foreword: The Study Group on Immigrant
Representation Symposium, Innovative Approaches to Immigrant Representation: Exploring New
Partnerships, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 331 (2011); Kirk Semple, Seeking Better Legal Help for
Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2014, at A19; Ross Todd, ABA’s Task Force on Legal
Education Issues Report but Won’t Seek Quick Action, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 29, 2014, at 2 (reporting
that the ABA’s Task Force on the Future of Legal Education recommended that state supreme
courts and bar associations “look for ways to license legal service providers who lack J.D.s but
can handle some legal services” in order to better serve unmet legal needs in their communities).
4. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
5. See, e.g., Hart v. Cmty. Sch. Bd., 383 F. Supp. 699, 706 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) (seeking
declaratory and injunctive relief regarding continued unconstitutional racial segregation of a junior
high school); Knight v. Bd. of Educ., 48 F.R.D. 115, 116 (E.D.N.Y. 1969) (challenging the
removal, without notice, of African-American students from their high school’s register for
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The paper records left me dissatisfied on the facts. I was confused and
daunted by the conflicts among the many groups and individuals likely
to be affected by a court decision. It was clear that many kids were
getting a raw deal—denied equality of opportunity in fact. So I repeatedly visited the classrooms and ghettos, following Karl Llewellyn’s
advice—I needed to get a sense for the situation.6
This led to:
Rule 1: Be humble. Listen. Try to learn what’s going on. If
you need to, get out of the courthouse.
I followed that rule many years later in a case involving a facility
on Long Island for the developmentally disabled, where I saw children
sitting “half-naked and unattended in their own urine and feces on cold
floors in dismal surroundings while untrained attendants watched
television.”7
During a series of hearings held across the nation as part of the
Agent Orange litigation, I saw “young widows who ha[d] seen their
strapping young husbands die of cancer . . . [and] strong men who ha[d]
tears welling up in their eyes as they t[old] of fear that their families
[would] be left without support because of their imminent death . . . .”8
Today, we are starting to bring litigants into the courthouse directly
alleged truancy). See also Jack B. Weinstein, Equality, Liberty and the Public Schools, 48 U. CIN.
L. REV. 203, 204 (1979); JEFFREY B. MORRIS, LEADERSHIP ON THE FEDERAL BENCH: THE CRAFT
AND ACTIVISM OF JACK WEINSTEIN 143–52, 168–73 (2011).
6. Thomas W. Mayo, Charles D. Breitel—Judging in the Grand Style, 47 FORDHAM L. REV.
1, 6 (1978) (quoting Chief Judge Breitel who summarized Llewellyn’s central thesis as follows:
when a judge derives new rules from existing rules in order to apply them to the case at hand, he
must make explicit the socio-economic facts in which he grounds that derivation, and, in order
“‘[t]o accomplish this[,] the judge must have a situation sense’”).
7. Soc’y for Good Will to Retarded Children v. Cuomo, 745 F. Supp. 879, 879 (E.D.N.Y.
1990).
8. In re “Agent Orange” Product Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 764 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
The quotations do not begin to reflect the moving sights and sounds of the
hearings—broken-hearted young widows who have seen their strapping
young husbands die of cancer, wives who must live with husbands wracked with
pain and in deep depression, mothers whose children suffer from multiple birth
defects and require almost saint-like daily care, the strong men who have tears
welling up in their eyes as they tell of fear that their families will be left without
support because of their imminent death, the man whose mind is so clouded he must
be prompted by his wife standing by with his defective child in her arms to go on
with his speech, the veterans trying to control the rage that wells up within them, the
crippled and diseased with running sores and green fungus growths, and the women
who volunteered for field or Red Cross duty and now feel themselves rejected and
sick with what they believe are Agent Orange related diseases.
Id. See also PETER H. SCHUCK, AGENT ORANGE ON TRIAL: MASS TOXIC DISASTERS IN THE
COURTS 173–78 (1986) (describing further the mindset and testimony of witnesses in the Agent
Orange litigation).
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through videoconferencing and other uses of current technology.9 I call
this democratizing the legal process.10 Those who are injured need to
have the opportunity to be heard and to know that someone in authority
is listening.
An early segregated school case, Hart v. Community School Board,
involved Mark Twain Middle School in Coney Island, New York.11
Affected communities split on how to resolve the matter. Relying on
medieval equity cases,12 I appointed a Special Master and formulated:
Rule 2: A Special Master is often needed to talk to those
affected—to act as a bridge and buffer for the judge. Appoint
a smart person who you know would never embarrass the
court—preferably a friend, one who can deal with people and
help make deals. In particularly thorny cases, multiple Special
Masters may be needed to approach the political, psychological, and economic aspects of the case and to help execute
settlements.
A Columbia University professor, Curtis Berger, was appointed
Special Master in Hart.13 Together and with the community, we developed a magnet school that still operates today. Special Masters put the
judge into the real world where he or she can seek a practical, resultsoriented solution.
A.

Agent Orange

The 1980s Agent Orange case presented large legal-factual-political problems.14 The case was based on herbicidal spraying of the jungles—and consequently, United States troops—in Vietnam.15 Kenneth
Feinberg, who helped develop some of my “Rules,” served as one of
four Special Masters in the case.16 He and I toured the nation speaking
9. See Boykin v. 1 Prospect Park ALF, LLC, 292 F.R.D. 161, 161 (E.D.N.Y. 2013)
(ordering live-streaming of summary judgment and class-certification hearing in putative class
action involving residents of assisted living facility).
10. Jack B. Weinstein, The Democratization of Mass Actions in the Internet Age, 45 COLUM.
J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 451, 455 (2012); see also Kenneth R. Feinberg, Democratization of Mass
Litigation: Empowering the Beneficiaries, 45 COLUM. J. L. & SOC. PROBS. 481, 490–91 (2012).
11. 383 F. Supp. 699, 706.
12. See generally Linda J. Silberman, Masters and Magistrates Part I: The English Model, 50
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1070, 1075–79 (1975).
13. Curtis J. Berger, Away from the Court House and into the Field: The Odyssey of a Special
Master, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 707 (1978).
14. See generally SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 3–15 (explaining the technological advances and
historical events that led to a never before seen mass toxic tort); see also id. at 92–93.
15. In re “Agent Orange” Product Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 775–77 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
16. Id. at 752–53 (“With the approval of the parties, in April 1984, Kenneth R. Feinberg,
David I. Shapiro, and Leonard Garment, Esqs., all of Washington, D.C., were appointed as Special
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and listening to Vietnam veterans who had been affected by the
sprayings.
The paperwork involved in this case was huge. Federal Judge Shira
Scheindlin, then a magistrate, and a panelist at this Symposium, gathered the facts so that this huge case was trial-ready and ripe for
settlement.17
Judges need all the help they can get in large complex cases. We
are fortunate that judges receive extensive assistance from able and talented colleagues. This leads us to:
Rule 3: Expand the role of magistrate judges and Special Masters to supervise discovery and to assist the trial judge in other
ways.
The next Rule is central to all litigation. It is:
Rule 4: Get the money out fast to those who should get it.
This principal requires the trial judge to strictly control lawyers, to
move the cases, to ensure that clients receive some of the benefits of
wholesale cost efficiencies, to control against fake claims and unwarranted fees, and to provide relief as quickly as practicable to those who
deserve it. Plaintiffs’ Attorneys Committee members and leaders must
be trustworthy. The court must know what’s going on. In Agent Orange,
fees were kept under ten percent, and criteria for membership in the
class and for compensation were set by the court.18
Getting the money out fast and properly may also require an ad hoc
administrative institution to conserve and disperse funds. Insurance
companies, social work agencies in every state, and investment advisers
should be included, as they were in Agent Orange, when needed to get
the maximum benefit from the settlement funds.19
These first four rules are, in sum: Big cases require judges to exercise their powers to the fullest extent reasonable and necessary, to utilize
responsible assistance, and to get the money and other relief out as
quickly as possible and to the right people.
Masters to assist the parties in settling the case. Special Master Kenneth R. Feinberg had already
commenced preliminary work on the issues with the knowledge of the parties that such work
would be going forward.”).
17. SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 122–24; see also Shira A. Scheindlin, Discovering the
Discoverable: A Bird’s Eye View of Discovery in a Complex Multi-District Class Action
Litigation, 52 BROOK. L. REV. 397 (1986).
18. SCHUCK, supra note 8, at 192–93 (discussing attorney’s fee awards).
19. See Martha Minow, Judge for the Situation: Judge Jack Weinstein, Creator of Temporary
Administrative Agencies, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2010, 2019–21 (1997).
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D.E.S.

Another illustrative stop on my journey were the D.E.S. (diethylstilbestrol) cases.20 New York courts had made justice possible by
changing substantive law to allow for a daughter to recover damages pro
rata from all D.E.S. producers in existence in the year her mother used
the drug even though the precise manufacturer of the drug the mother
ingested was unknown.21 My view in disposing of large numbers of
individual cases was based in part on my conversations with the daughters, many of whom had been devastated by an inability to conceive the
children they and their spouses yearned for. Placing all the cases before
one judge was efficient. I was lucky. I had a plaintiff’s advocate, Sybil
Shainwald,22 who was devoted to her clients, and defendants’ counsel
who were reasonable. From my experience with the D.E.S Cases, Rules
5 and 6 followed:
Rule 5: Sometimes the judge needs to let empathy flow.
Rule 6: Choice of law, personal jurisdiction, and procedural
rules can be applied to permit individual cases from all over
the country to be placed before one judge in a substantively
welcoming state.23 Mass cases need mass treatment—one
court, one judge, one law.
C.

Asbestos and Cigarettes

In the asbestos cases, some seventy Brooklyn Navy Yard complaints tried in two batches. They were the basis for many subsequent
settlements.24 Rules 7 and 8 resulted:
20. See In re DES Cases, 789 F. Supp. 552 (E.D.N.Y. 1992); Braune v. Abbott Labs., 895 F.
Supp. 530 (E.D.N.Y. 1995).
21. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989) (“[E]xant common-law
doctrines, unmodified, provide no relief for the DES plaintiff unable to identify the manufacturer
of the drug that injured her. . . . [However], it would be inconsistent with the reasonable
expectations of a modern society to say to these plaintiffs that . . . because so many manufacturers,
each behind a curtain, contributed to the devastation, the cost of injury should be borne by the
innocent and not the wrongdoers. . . . [I]t is more appropriate that the loss be borne by those that
produced the drug for use during pregnancy, rather than by those who were injured by the use,
even where the precise manufacturer of the drug cannot be identified in a particular action.”).
22. Id. at 1071.
23. See Jack B. Weinstein, Mass Tort Jurisdiction and Choice of Law in a Multinational
World: Communicating by Extraterrestrial Satellites, 37 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 145 (2001) (“My
thesis is that fair venue controls in personam jurisdiction and choice of law. In mass torts,
reduction of transactional costs, full protection of the largest number of those injured, the interest
of defendants in stability, and the prompt ending of litigations usually mandate application of one
law in one court.”).
24. See Kenneth P. Nolan, Weinstein on the Courts, 18 LITIG., Spring 1992, at 24–25
(explaining that trying as many as fifty of the Brooklyn Navy Yard cases at a time provided a
baseline model of what similar cases would be worth, enabling parties to conduct more informed
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Rule 7: Bellwether trials provide matrices for settling large
numbers of individual cases. Do not fear statistical analyses
that can solve substantive and procedural problems.25
I soon discovered that a few lawyers were grabbing huge fees and
awards. The enormous Manville Trust Fund designed for years of payments to asbestos victims was being swiftly depleted.26 This required:
Rule 8: To protect future claimants, the judge must step in fast
and sometimes stay all payments, appoint new trustees, and
enforce strict directions to protect now and in the future all
those injured. Firm judicial hands can prevent unfair allocations of available funds.
The imperative of “getting the money out fast” does not trump the basic
duty of the trial judge: to ensure that all parties before the court, present
and future, receive an equal measure of justice.27
The large cigarette cases illustrate a failure of imaginative use of
class actions and statistical analysis to remedy a national tragedy based
on a fraud that shortened the lives of millions of people.28 Efforts at
large-scale disposition were frustrated. Decades later, social pressures
and regulations have reduced the toll, but the law’s deterrence came too
late and too little. Trial judges’ power to try or settle these cases en
masse was largely frustrated by extremely narrow class action appellate
rulings.
settlement negotiations). A similar, more general attempt by another judge of the Eastern District
of New York to try 48 test cases in a consolidated group of 600 asbestos cases was struck down by
the court of appeals. See Malcolm v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 995 F.2d 346, 354 (2d Cir. 1993).
25. See United States v. DiCristina, 726 F.3d 92, 94 (2d Cir. 2013); UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli
Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2010); In re Simon II Litig., 407 F.3d 125, 127–28 (2d Cir.
2005), rev’g 211 F.R.D. 86 (E.D.N.Y. 2005).
26. See In re Joint E. & S. Dist. Asbestos Litig., 129 B.R. 710, 915 (E. & S.D.N.Y. 1991).
27. A somewhat different problem related to “getting the money out fast” arose in County of
Suffolk v. Long Island Lighting Co., 710 F. Supp. 1428 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). There, an atomic reactor
was scrapped, and the public utility was ordered to pay back some $6 billion ratepayers who had
been charged for its construction. See id. at 1433–34. Immediate payment would have bankrupted
the utility. See id. at 1438. The utility was ordered to pay back the sums owed in reductions from
electric bills over a period of years. See id. at 1433, 1456–57. The result was not entirely
satisfactory because some rate payers who moved out received no reductions while some who had
moved in received rebates. See id. at 1469. Unfair, yes. But some rough and ready solutions to
avoid excess costs and achieve a generally fair solution are sometimes necessary in mass cases.
See also MORRIS, supra note 5, at 230–39.
28. See McLaughlin v. Am. Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215, 234 (2d Cir. 2008) (refusing to
certify a class despite the existence of common issues because, “given the number of questions
that would remain for individual adjudication, issue certification would not ‘reduce the range of
issues in dispute and promote judicial economy.’”), rev’g 449 F. Supp. 2d 992 (E.D.N.Y. 2006);
In re Simon II, 407 F.3d at 127–28 (holding that the class must be vacated because there was no
evidence to ascertain the limits of the fund or the aggregate value of the punitive claims).
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Pharmaceutical Hazards: Zyprexa

Individual cases can be handled effectively with multidistrict litigations or their equivalents.
Rule 9: Benefits of class actions can be obtained by, in effect,
consolidating individual actions into a quasi-class action.
The recently completed Zyprexa multi-district pharmaceutical litigation—in which about 30,000 individual cases were settled and disposed of for some $6 billion29—with sharp limits on fees and
expenses—suggested why a quasi-class action concept30 is needed when
class action status is not available.31
In some respects, a quasi-class action of consolidated individual
suits is more effective than a class action. It avoids interlocutory
appeals.32 Those appeals slow down the case for years and reduce the
ability of judges and litigants to resolve the matters fairly and relatively
quickly.
E.

Long Term Trends

Current trends in mass actions are disturbing. My view is embodied
in:
Rule 10: Denying the little guy effective access to the courts is
unjust.
Increasingly, suits for workers and consumers are being blocked by
mass forced consent to arbitration clauses, thereby preventing class
actions and other appropriate forms of litigation.33 But did the signers of
these clauses understand what they signed, and did they act voluntarily?
In a recent case before me where non-English-speaking workers in a
supermarket complained of being cheated out of statutory minimum
29. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 260 F.R.D. 13, 16, 25 (E.D.N.Y. 2009).
30. See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006); In re Zyprexa
Prods. Liab. Litig., 467 F. Supp. 2d 256, 262 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (“The court, magistrate judge and
special masters will continue to administer this litigation as a quasi-class action.”).
31. See UFCW Local 1776 v. Eli Lilly & Co., 620 F.3d 121, 131–37 (2d Cir. 2010) (reversing
the district court’s class certification order because the class could not establish “substantial
elements of its claim against Lilly” using “generalized, rather than individualized, proof”).
32. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23.
33. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., No. 12-133, slip op. at 3 (U.S. June 20,
2013) (“[A]rbitration is a matter of contract . . . [and] courts must ‘rigorously enforce’ arbitration
agreements according to their terms.”); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, No. 09-893, slip. op.
at 18 (U.S. Apr. 27, 2011) (finding California case law—which held class arbitration agreements
to be unconscionable and therefore unenforceable—to be preempted by the Federal Arbitration
Act, which favors arbitration). But see Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct.
1758, 1764 (2010) (finding the imposition of “class arbitration on parties whose arbitration
clauses are ‘silent’ on that issue” improper and inconsistent with the Federal Arbitration Act).

2015]

JUDGES DEALING WITH THE REAL WORLD

363

wages, some workers were neither knowledgeable nor free to reject an
arbitration clause without being fired.34 Arbitration clauses that block
litigation must sometimes be analyzed by asking one of the first questions posed in our first-year contracts course: Was there a voluntary
meeting of the minds?
The 1938 Federal Rules of Civil Procedure opened the doors to our
courthouses for the poor, the oppressed, and the legally deprived. Easy
pleading, full discovery, and subsequent class action amendments were
critical.35 That door is now being closed by reducing the availability of
class actions through legislation and judicial decisions, by tightening the
pleading rules, by limiting discovery, by encouraging summary judgment, by increasing standing requirements, by favoring arbitrations over
litigation,36 and by a generally negative attitude toward joint action
through unions, other voluntary associations, or individuals being denied
standing.37
The view from below is not all negative. Gender and disability discrimination suits, pro-civil rights decisions, and other substantive rulings
have strengthened the litigation power of many individual litigants. Particularly important have been mandatory fee-shifting provisions encouraging lawyers to take such cases.38 In the federal Fair Labor Standards
Act,39 provisions for opt-in class actions—which act as barriers to the
continued erosion of class actions—appear to be standing firm.
Massive litigation will probably become more acute as we experience more natural disasters—and no fewer man-made ones—in the
coming years.40 Our legal system must be prepared to meet these challenges to ensure that prompt justice is available to those who seek it.
34. See Limon v. Saleh, No. 1:13-cv-03421 (E.D.N.Y. Jun. 14, 2013).
35. See Jack B. Weinstein, After Fifty Years of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Are the
Barriers to Justice Being Raised?, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 1901, 1906 (1989).
36. See Am. Express Co., No. 12-133; AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 09-893.
37. See Arthur R. Miller, The Preservation and Rejuvenation of Aggregate Litigation: A
Systemic Imperative, 64 EMORY L.J. 293 (2014); Vaughn R. Walker, Class Actions Along the Path
of Federal Rule Making, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 445, 445 (2012) (noting that “courts have ‘tightened
the requirements for almost every element of class certification’”); Archis Parasharami et al.,
Litigation: Challenging Class Certification for Lack of Article III Standing, INSIDE COUNS. (Jan.
3, 2013), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/01/03/litigation-challenging-class-certification-forlac.
38. See Robert V. Percival & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Role of Attorney Fee Shifting in Public
Interest Litigation, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 233, 233 (1984) (noting more than 150 federal
statutes authorizing attorney fee shifting).
39. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219 (2012)).
40. See THE LAW OF ADAPTATION TO CLIMATE CHANGE: U.S. AND INTERNATIONAL ASPECTS
4–8 (Michael B. Gerrard & Katrina Fischer Kuh eds., 2012) (discussing an anticipated increase in
the frequency of droughts, intense precipitation and flooding, heat waves, wildfires, and other
extreme climatic conditions throughout the globe); VIVIEN GORNITZ, RISING SEAS: PAST, PRESENT,
FUTURE (2013).
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CRIMINAL LAW, THREE RULES

Rule 1: Unnecessary cruelty, destruction of people and communities, and huge costs to taxpayers should be avoided.
Trial court decisions insistently and consistently demonstrated the
unnecessary cruelty of original guideline sentencing.41 Ultimately, the
Supreme Court heard the cries of injustice and granted sentencing judges
discretion to sentence reasonably.42
Like dogs howling at the gate,43 trial judges have warned of the
rank injustice of many mandatory statutory minimums. Congress has not
yet yielded to our entreaties (except in a partial amelioration of crack
cocaine penalties).44 But public pressure to eliminate prison-filling and
cruel mandatory minimums is building.45
Representation of defendants in federal criminal cases is generally
good. This is apparently not true in some states.
Collateral attacks on state and federal convictions do not require
attorneys for petitioners; but despite budgetary problems, federal judges
are appointing counsel and lawyers under the Criminal Justice Act.46
And pro bono lawyers and students are exposing unjust convictions and
laying the groundwork for more careful investigations, trials, and appropriate criminal judgments.47
Rule 2: The main protection for defendants is good lawyering.
As we observe the fiftieth anniversary of Gideon v. Wainwright,48 a
decision that brought our criminal justice system closer to that noble
promise of “equal justice under law,” we must take measure of the major
work yet to be done. As the Supreme Court has declared, “when a State
brings its judicial power to bear on an indigent defendant in a criminal
proceeding, it must take steps to assure that the defendant has a fair
41. A. G. Sulzberger, Defiant Judge Takes on Old Child Pornography Law, N.Y. TIMES, May
22, 2010, at A1.
42. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 305 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the
“notorious unpopularity of the Guidelines with many district judges”).
43. See William Blake, Auguries of Innocence, reprinted in THE POETRY AND PROSE OF
WILLIAM BLAKE 481 (David V. Erdman ed., 1965); ENGLISH POETRY II: FROM COLLINS TO
FITZGERALD, THE HARVARD CLASSICS (1909–14) (“A dog starvd at his Master’s Gate / Predicts
the ruin of the State”).
44. Fair Sentencing Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-220, §§ 1–3, 124 Stat. 2372, 2372–74
(2010).
45. See, e.g., Editorial, Unjust Mandatory Minimums, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 2013, at A22. But
see Douglas A. Berman, A Cynic’s Guide to All the Federal Sentencing Reform Buzz, 26 FED.
SENT’G REP. 73, 74 (2013).
46. Criminal Justice Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-455, § 3006A, 78 Stat. 552 (1964).
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opportunity to present his defense.”49 Those advocating on behalf of the
criminally accused must possess the tools required for their formidable
task, including ready access to expert investigative and forensic
assistance.50
In the sentencing and post-sentencing areas, we are making
advances through trial judges reducing unnecessary incarcerations.
Increasing reliance on probation and closely supervised release by courts
more effectively helps the drug addicted, the mentally afflicted, and the
educationally and job deprived to enter a lawful, productive life.51 Cooperation among judges, probation officers, social workers, and private
helping agencies is also increasing.52
Rule 3: Judges should use their discretion to minimize injustice and to encourage prosecutors (through charging and plea
decisions) to do the same. We are here to save where possible,
not to destroy unnecessarily.53
The Attorney General, as well as local prosecutors, can reduce
injustice by appropriate charging and plea decisions. Judges can speak
out. In the Eastern District of New York, under the leadership of Judge
John Gleeson, “[f]ederal judges . . . [have] team[ed] up with prosecutors
to create special treatment programs [(“drug courts”)] for drug-addicted
defendants who would otherwise face significant prison time, an effort
intended to sidestep drug laws widely seen as inflexible and overly punitive.”54 Cases based on excessive stops, frisks, false arrests, and a whole
panoply of prosecutorial abuses can be effectively addressed.
IV.

GENERAL RULE

General Rule: If you see something is wrong, say something
is wrong—and try to correct it.55
49. Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 76 (1985).
50. See John H. Blume & Sheri Lynn Johnson, Gideon Exceptionalism?, 122 YALE L.J. 2126,
2137–47 (2013). “Until the Supreme Court both significantly raises the bar as to the quality of
representation . . . and requires states to provide more than paltry investigative and expert services
to indigent defendants, Gideon will remain an unfulfilled dream of what could and should have
been.” Id. at 2147.
51. See Peter Raynor & Gwen Robinson, Why Help Offenders? Arguments for Rehabilitation
as a Penal Strategy, 1 EUR. J. PROBATION, no. 1, 2009.
52. Mission Statement, AM. PROBATION & PAROLE ASS’N, http://www.appa-net.org/eweb/
DynamicPage.aspx?WebCode=IA_Introduction (last visited Sept. 25, 2014).
53. United States v. C.R., 972 F. Supp. 2d 457, 457–58 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (“The effect of harsh
minimum sentences in cases such as C.R.’s is, effectively, to destroy young lives unnecessarily.”).
54. Mosi Secret, Outside Box, U.S. Judges Offer Addicts New Path, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2,
2013, at A1.
55. See Jack B. Weinstein, Every Day Is a Good Day for a Judge to Lay Down His
Professional Life for Justice, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 131 (2004).
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In sum, the image of Justice that adorns so many courthouses in
this country—blindfolded and dressed in majestic robes—too often
departs from what we deal with in the real world. Trial judges must have
the courage to inform Empress Justice when her garments have grown
tattered or outmoded. It is appropriate to publicize legal deficiencies in
extra-judicial writings and teachings, and to act to dispense justice
where possible.
Future disasters and resulting mass litigations are likely to be even
more challenging than mass tort actions of the past and present.56 This is
a subject worth discussing for a future symposium under the possible
heading of: “Mass Litigations and Disasters Require the Integration and
Coordination of Our Legal Systems.”

56. See, e.g., Jeff Goodell, Why the City of Miami is Doomed to Drown, ROLLING STONE,
June 20, 2013, available at http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/why-the-city-of-miami-isdoomed-to-drown-20130620.

